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Hodges et al.: Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media

Like War: The Weaponization of Social Media, by
P. W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 2018. 416 pages. $28.

An old adage states that truth is the
first casualty of war. P. W. Singer and
Emerson T. Brooking argue in Like
War that this is especially true of social
media wars. Singer and Brooking detail
the systematic ways in which both
state and nonstate actors use social
media to alter the accepted narrative
of truth—with profound implications
for international and domestic politics.
Drawing from psychology, sociology,
and the history of technology, the
authors trace the rise of social media,
offer an explanation for its power, and
look at its political effects. In their final
chapters, they examine the business
model of social media firms, looking at
the difficulties it poses for states seeking
to defend against social media information and disinformation campaigns
and how it makes change unlikely.
The goal of weaponized social media is
not to replace the truth with a single,
coherent lie. Instead, it is to sow doubt
and confusion about what is true and
what is not. Referring specifically to
Russian disinformation efforts, one
expert describes the goal as “fomenting confusion, chaos, and distrust.
They spin up their audience to chase
myths, believe in fantasies, and listen
to faux . . . ‘experts’ until the audience
simply tunes out” (p. 108). This theme
emerges consistently as one of the most
powerful aspects of social media: the
ability to obscure objectivity and enable
exploitation of preexisting biases.
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The title of the book is a two-level
pun, alluding to both the competition
for social media “likes” and the
similarities in political effect between
social media and military campaigns.
The authors focus on how social media
can be used to affect the “will” leg
of the Clausewitzian trinity of force,
chance, and will. They detail efforts of
authoritarian regimes, including those
of China, Russia, and Syria, to control
domestic and international political
messaging through social media. They
document the role of social media in
recruiting fighters and raising money
for Daesh (ISIS, ISIL)—and the way in
which states and advocacy groups have
used social media to undercut Daesh’s
Internet messaging and entice fighters
away from the group. They provide a
detailed account of Russia’s disinformation efforts using government-employed
“trolls” and quasi-media organizations,
such as Russia Today (RT). Citing an
expert from the Atlantic Council, the
authors identify four principles of
Russian disinformation: “dismiss the
critic, distort the facts, distract from the
main issue, and dismay the audience”
(p. 107). To these “4 Ds” the authors
add a fifth to describe Russia’s political
warfare campaigns: divide the target
population. Anyone who has engaged
in a political argument on social media
will recognize these principles—which
highlights the success of these efforts
in shaping U.S. political discourse.
The analogy to war is not limited to
the domain of will, however. Singer
and Brooking chronicle the very real
contributions of social media campaigns to battlefield outcomes in
Israel, Ukraine, and Syria. They also
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document the way in which China is
incorporating social media into the
work of its security services, creating
a socially enabled totalitarianism.
Like War is a work of journalism,
not social science. Readers seeking
original research or big-data analysis
in support of the authors’ conclusions
will be disappointed. The book’s
source notes frequently cite blog posts
alongside peer-reviewed studies, with
no obvious distinction in how much
weight is given to each. Still, Singer and
Brooking have done thorough research
into the psychology and sociology of
how and why messages become viral
and what gives viral messages power,
as well as numerous interviews with
a variety of actors in the social media
space. They have assembled a compelling anecdotal narrative with short,
evocative profiles and vignettes that
bring texture and life to their story.
The most disappointing omission from
the book is any concrete sense of what
can be done to counter the pernicious
effects of social media. The authors
conclude with a call for readers to be
discerning consumers of news—a call
that feels both pro forma and inadequate
to the threat they describe. Singer and
Brooking have illuminated an important
problem but offer little cause for hope
or optimism about its resolution.
Like War enters a crowded field of books
on the political impact of social media.
It is distinguished by its readability and
thorough research. I highly recommend
it to policy makers and military officers
seeking a better understanding of the
information forces that are shaping
contemporary and future battles.
DOYLE HODGES
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Champion of the Quarterdeck: Admiral Sir Erasmus Gower (1742–1814), by Ian M. Bates. Pomona, QLD, Austral.: Sage Old Books, 2017. 384
pages. $38.

Admiral Sir Erasmus Gower is, perhaps,
the least known of all the British admirals during the age of Nelson. Although
little known today as a naval officer, his
name is indeed on the map: Cape Gower
in China, Gower Harbour in Papua New
Guinea, Gower Island in the Solomon
Islands, Gower Lake in Newfoundland,
Gower Point in British Columbia,
and Gower Street in Saint John’s,
Newfoundland. A man of such note is
undoubtedly worthy of a biographical
study. Ian M. Bates, who retired after a
career with Australia’s Department of
External Territories in the public service
of Papua New Guinea, has taken up the
challenge and produced this extensively
researched study of Gower’s naval career.
A modest man, Erasmus Gower left
neither a memoir nor personal files of
correspondence, leaving Bates to ferret
through masses of archival material to
piece the story together from official
documents to verify and expand on
the few printed notices of his life that
appeared in the contemporary Naval
Chronicle. Born in Wales in 1742, Gower
joined the Royal Navy at the age of
thirteen in 1756 and served until 1807,
when he retired as a vice admiral, and
later rose to admiral of the white on
the retired list. Bates has summarized
Gower’s varied and extensive career in
the following lines: “No other contemporary officer approached his accumulated experience or could claim to have
completed two circumnavigations of
the world. Crossed the equator eighteen
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